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Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in the
past two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empirics
of inequality (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we may
attribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand for
high skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channel
in which the wage premium for skill may grow - increased ﬁrm entry.
We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types of
workers and homogeneous ﬁrms must set wages and preferences for
what type of worker they would like to hire. We ﬁnd that both the
wage diﬀerential and the demand for high skill workers can increase
with the proportion of high skill workers - these high skill workers
therefore “create” their own demand without exogenous factors. In
addition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with the
between group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are provided
in order to compare the ﬁndings with empirical results.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D83, J31,J41
Keywords: wage posting, wage inequality, search
∗I thank Patrick Bolton, Matthew Ellman, Maia Guell, Robert Shimer, Karen Con-
neely, and Kosuke Aoki for excellent comments and suggestions. I have also beneﬁtted
from comments from the Princeton Public Finance Working Group. Financial support
from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation is appreciated.
†Contact: Joel Shapiro, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Departament D’Economia
i Empresa, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona SPAIN. email:
joel.shapiro@econ.upf.es phone: (34) 93 542 2718
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in the past two
decades1. Most studies2 trying to explain the wage premium have focused on
demand factors; technology-skill complementarities and international trade’s
eﬀect on skill composition are the most prominent explanations3. Neverthe-
less, a signiﬁcant amount of the variation in wages is not explained by these
factors.
This paper seeks to take one step back and ask whether a simple model
of a frictional labor market can produce similar wage dynamics without such
factors as technology-skill complementarities or international trade. There
are two compelling reasons to pursue this avenue. The ﬁrst is to under-
stand more fully how imperfections in the labor market aﬀect the wage
structure. The second is to demonstrate that the current theoretical liter-
ature potentially overstates the contribution of heterogeneity in technology
by combining it with labor market frictions.
We assume that there are two types of workers (high skill and low skill)
and one type of ﬁrm. In a standard supply and demand framework this
clearly implies that absent outside factors, a large increase in the supply of
high skilled workers should result in a fall in the wage premium for skill. This
lies in contrast to the data, and the empirical literature has overwhelmingly
pointed to increases in the demand for skill. Where does this demand come
from? In our model, high skill workers can create demand for themselves by
making it more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to enter.
The imperfection we consider comes from the matching between workers
and ﬁrms. We assume that each ﬁrm has two tasks, a high skill and a low
skill one. High skill workers may produce in either, while low skill workers
may only produce in the low skill task. Firms open positions at a cost and
set wages and preferences for the type of worker they would like to employ.
Workers come into contact with a ﬁxed number of jobs, apply, and then
choose among the jobs that are oﬀered to them. This model has similar
characteristics and dynamics as other wage posting models (for example,
Burdett and Judd (1983)), but abstracts away from worker search behavior
in order to clearly study wage inequality.
In equilibrium, it is not necessarily the case that ﬁrms will prefer high
1For a quick view of the data on wage inequality, Murphy and Welch (1993), Figures
1-3 display the trends quite well.
2For surveys of the literature, see Levy and Murnane (1992) and Aghion et.al. (1999).
3Katz and Murphy (1992) also point compellingly to the rate of change in the supply
of college graduates as one explanation of the data.
2skill workers. If high skill workers’ reservation wages are too large, ﬁrms will
choose to employ low skill workers. The expected income of a worker can be
represented in an extremely simple manner: the probability of having more
than one job oﬀer multiplied by the worker’s output plus the probability of
having only one job oﬀer multiplied by the worker’s reservation wage. This
shows that the more likely it is for the worker to have an outside oﬀer, the
more rent can be extracted from the ﬁrms.
We prove that if wage inequality increases with the proportion of high
skill workers, it must come from increased ﬁrm entry. Using a simulation, we
are able to display cases where wage inequality is increasing in the proportion
of high skill workers. It occurs in labor markets where ﬁrms prefer high
skilled workers, where costs of entry are high and where the proportion of
high skill workers is low. In such labor markets we may therefore ﬁnd that
high skill workers increase demand for themselves exclusive of any external
factors. Given that we have wage distributions in equilibrium, we are also
able to discuss wage dispersion and within group wage inequality. In regions
where wage inequality between groups is increasing we ﬁnd that there is also
increasing wage inequality within each group.
Our work is most comparable with Acemoglu (1998, 1999). He assumes
labor market frictions come from random matching and that there is bar-
gaining between workers and ﬁrms. His main focus, however, is to show
how endogenous investment decisions can change job composition and hence
wage inequality. Shi (2001) and Shimer (2001) also discuss wage inequality
in a directed search framework with heterogeneity in workers and capital.
Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2000) focus on discrimination in a directed
search framework, but as they assume two types of worker and one type of
ﬁrm, their results are comparable with those here. They ﬁnd a complete
separation of markets based on type. Shimer (1998) also considers a two
type worker population and explores how ﬁrms’ preferences depend on how
wages are determined (i.e. bargaining versus wage posting).
In section 2, we set up the model. In section 3 we provide our main
results and in section 4 we conclude.
2 The Model
We construct a one period labor market in which:
• Firms borrow money to open a position at cost k, have two tasks, post
wages for each one, and decide what task they prefer to be accom-
plished if possible.
3• Two types of workers apply for positions and decide which task is
appropriate for them to perform in each position.
While our results are quite clear and simple, we need some machinery
to describe the equilibrium. We proceed by going through each part of the
market.
2.1 Labor Market Frictions
The main assumption in this paper is that of an exogenous application/search
process4, which allows us to solve in a tractable manner. Workers meet ran-
domly a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. This can be interpreted as workers ﬁnding
a subset of the job opportunities available through advertisements (in the
classiﬁeds, on the internet) or through intermediaries. It is logical that ﬁrms
within the same labor market meet workers in uniform ways.
The application process that we specify utilizes the basic dynamics of
nonsequential search established in Burdett and Judd (1983)5. Consider the
labor market interactions of a mass of ﬁrms and a mass of workers. Each
ﬁrm has one position available. Workers apply to n ﬁrms drawn at random
from the available pool. If all workers only apply to just one ﬁrm, then ﬁrms
will set wages at the workers’ reservation level since workers will not have
the option to refuse an oﬀer. This is the ‘Diamond-paradox’. However, if
workers apply to more than one ﬁrm, some will have a positive probability of
being able to refuse a low oﬀer, putting pressure on ﬁrms to raise their wages
in order to increase the probability of getting a worker. This creates a wage
distribution in equilibrium6. Therefore, the existence of some probability
with which workers can compare wages drives wage dispersion. In our model
the probability of a worker’s application succeeding (yielding a job oﬀer) is
between 0 and 1, implying that more than one application will allow some
workers to compare wages. To obtain wage dispersion with closed form
solutions, we limit the number of applications7 to two.
4Many search models assume an exogenous search process, e.g. Varian (1980) and Stahl
(1989), but obtain wage dispersion from the heterogeneity of agents. Here all workers
searching for jobs are homogeneous and search in the exact same way. Ex-post hetero-
geneity creates the dispersion in wages.
5Burdett and Judd (1983) is actually a model of price dispersion. The description
above translates it into a model of wage dispersion (price=wage, consumers=workers).
6Here we don’t have to worry about the ‘Bertrand result’ where ﬁrms face so much
pressure to raise wages that wage distribution is an atom at the highest possible value.
This only occurs when workers sample more than one wage with probability 1, which can’t
occur in the labor market we describe.
7Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2001) look at externalities caused by multiple appli-
42.2 Labor Market Participants
Workers
There are two types of workers, high skill and low skill. High skill workers
represent a fraction µ of the total amount of workers, which is normalized
to 1. A high skill worker can perform a high skill task, which yields output
fh, or a low skill task, which yields output fl. The low skill worker may only
perform the low skill task. Wages may be made conditional on output, a
test, or on one’s credentials; in any case, the high skill worker must be given
incentives to perform the high skill task8. In addition, the reservation wages










We characterize the wage distribution for a type i w o r k e rb yac d fGi(w)
and its associated pdf gi(w) deﬁned over the range [a,b]. For a given prob-
ability λ of receiving a job oﬀer at one ﬁrm, the expected wage of a worker








where the ﬁrst term represents the product of the probability of two
successful applications and the expectation of the top wage given two sam-
ples, and the second term represents the product of the probability of one
successful application and the expected wage given one sample.
Firms
The cost of opening a position in this labor market is ˜ k. Firms may
borrow to open the position at an interest rate of r (we deﬁne k =( 1+r)˜ k).
Should the ﬁrm not be able to pay k on time, they suﬀer some additional
default cost d. We will call each position a ﬁrm, although it is possible to
think of one ﬁrm recruiting separately for several positions. The assumption
of a one worker - one ﬁrm match is also employed in Montgomery (1991)
and Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) in order to discuss the impact of tightness
in the labor market. There are a large number of potential ﬁrms, but in
equilibrium a mass M of them enters, each receiving expected proﬁts of
zero. We assume that the equilibrium number of ﬁrms M is greater than 2
(there are more ﬁrms than applications).
cations in matching functions.
8This can also be considered as a simple adverse selection problem for the high type.
Since utility is not type dependent here, the high type will apply for the high skill task
when the wage oﬀered for it is greater than that oﬀered for the low skill task.
5Each position oﬀered is ﬂexible in the sense that the technology may
accommodate either a low skill or a high skill worker, although a high skill
worker may be more productive. We may think of the extremes, where
a high school dropout has a huge productivity disadvantage in the ﬁeld of
nuclear physicist or where a diplomat has a reservation value so high that the
compensation needed for her to work in McDonald’s would be tremendous.
However, many markets are somewhere in between. Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994) provide evidence that highly educated workers are working
in manufacturing jobs that were previously the domain of those with lesser
education.
The ﬁrm is free to oﬀer distinct wages for a high skill or low skill task.
Since high skill workers must be given incentives9 to choose the high skill
task, the wage for that task must be higher than the wage for the lower skill
task. In equilibrium, therefore, we will see high skill workers at high skill
tasks and low skill workers at low skill tasks.
As both types of workers may apply to a given ﬁrm, each ﬁrm needs
some type of hiring policy. We allow this policy to be endogenous and take
the form: “If some i types show up, we will choose randomly among them. If
no i types show up and j types are around, we will choose randomly among
j types.” Essentially, the ﬁrm may have a preference, but if it is not able
to exercise this preference, it will still try to ﬁll its position to recover some
surplus. This preference, and the wages oﬀered for each type of task, are
the choice variables of the ﬁrm.
We deﬁne βi as the probability that at least one person who wants to













. We use these to discuss the preference of
the ﬁrm over tasks. Writing the expected proﬁts10 for a ﬁrm posting wages
wh and wl that has a preference for a type h worker (the expected proﬁts
for Eπl can be written in an analogous manner):
Eπh(wh,w l)=( 1 − e− 2
M ){βhph(wh)(fh − wh)+( 1− βh)pl(wl)(fl − wl)}
−{1 − (1 − e− 2
M )(βhph(wh)+( 1− βh)pl(wl)}d − k
9The ﬁrm may, on the other hand, set the high skill task wage lower than or equal the
low skill task wage, thus encouraging high skill workers to perform the low skill task. This
is not optimal in equilibrium no matter what task the ﬁrm prefers, essentially since the
waste of the added productivity can’t be balanced out by the shifts in probabilities. A
p r o o fo ft h i si sa v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r .
10We assume that output is sold by the ﬁrm at a price normalized to 1.
6The ﬁrst line represents the revenues. The ﬁrst term represents the
probability that at least one worker shows up. Within the brackets, there
are two terms: the expected payoﬀ from task h and the expected payoﬀ from
task l. The expected payoﬀs depend on the preference of the ﬁrm for the
task and the return from the task (output minus wage) multiplied by the
probability that the worker who is oﬀered the job accepts the oﬀer. For now
we refer to this probability as pi(wi) for task i with wage wi. The second
line represents the revenues. If the ﬁrm does not match, it defaults and pays
added cost d, and in any case is responsible for the cost of the machine k.
This can be rewritten as:
Eπh( ˜ w)=( 1− e− 2
M ){βhph(wh)(fh − wh + d)+( 1− βh)pl(wl)(fl − wl + d)} − d − k
(2)
2.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
Now we establish a simple, but important property of preferences.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, all ﬁrms who oﬀer wage wi for task i have the
same preference over high and low tasks.
Proof. Suppose this is not true. Firm 1 prefers the high task and oﬀers
wages wh and w1
l . Firm 2 prefers the low task and oﬀers wages wh and w2
l .
This then implies that the proﬁts for Firm 2 at the low task are greater than
the proﬁts for Firm 1 at the low task. (pl(w2
l )(fl − w2
l )) >p l(w1
l )(fl − w1
l ))
and therefore Firm 1 has a proﬁtable deviation to w2
l .
This property is critical to establishing equilibrium behavior. It allows
us to deﬁne pi(wi) as a function only concerned with preferences along the
wage distribution of task i; we don’t need to worry about whether preferences
depend on the associated wage from the other task. Consequently, we now
have an independence property, namely that expected payoﬀs in task i are
completely determined by wi (and not the wage from the other task). The
only connection remaining between the two tasks is the restriction that
wh ≥ wl. We will ignore this constraint, solve for the equilibrium, and then
verify that it holds. The next lemma characterizes the wage distributions.
7Lemma 2 Wages are distributed for task i along a continuous distribution
[w
¯
i,b i] and expected payoﬀs for the ﬁrm along this distribution are equal.
Proof. i) If all ﬁrms only oﬀered one wage, then there is a proﬁtable
deviation upward by ε, where the pay is larger, but the probability of the
worker having another oﬀer which is weakly preferred jumps discretely to 0.
Should the one wage equal fi, then there is a proﬁtable deviation by lowering
the wage - paying less and having a positive probability that a worker will
accept.
ii) Suppose there is a gap in the wage distribution. Then a ﬁrm oﬀering
a wage at the top of the gap can lower its wage by ε, pay less, and have the
same probability of attracting workers.
iii) Expected payoﬀs along the wage distribution must be equal. If not,
a ﬁrms will deviate to the wages which oﬀer higher payoﬀs.
iv) The ﬁrm which oﬀers the lowest wage in the distribution will only get
a worker if the worker has no other oﬀer. Therefore, they have the incentive
to lower the wage as much as possible, capturing proﬁts from this worker.




Each task oﬀers a ﬁxed expected payoﬀ to the ﬁrm, irrespective of the
wage paid. Therefore, ﬁrm preferences are constant over tasks: all ﬁrms
either always prefer high skill tasks or low skill tasks. For now, we defer
the preference decision in order to focus on expected payoﬀs for each task.
Once again, we use λ as the probability that a worker will get selected for
employment at a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Using this, the probability that the randomly
chosen worker will accept the ﬁrm’s oﬀer of wi, pi(wi), becomes 1 − λ +
λGi(wi), where the worker either does not have another oﬀer (probability
1 − λ) or has an oﬀer which is smaller than wi.
At task i, all wages oﬀer the equal payoﬀ of πi. Therefore for all wi :
(1 − λ + λGi(wi))(fi − wi)=πi (3)
The fact that the bottom wage equals the reservation wage w
¯
i for type
i workers allows us to solve explicitly for task i expected payoﬀs. Using the
endpoint condition G(w
¯
i)=0 , the payoﬀs equal (1−λ)(fi−w
¯
i). This payoﬀ
makes sense intuitively; it increases with the output of the task, decreases
with the reservation value of the workers, and decreases with the probability
that the ﬁrm must give a speciﬁc worker the job. The bargaining power of
8the worker, based on her outside option and degree of competition with
other workers, plays a strong role here. We will see later that despite the
fact that the problem is based on wage posting, the results will often have
clear bargaining interpretations.
The equal proﬁts condition now deﬁnes the cumulative distribution Gi(wi),





fi−wi ) and the top wage b = λfi+(1−
λ)w
¯
i. The possibility of ﬁrms having diﬀerent preferences means that a
worker faces diﬀerent probabilities of acceptance at a ﬁrm that prefers his
task and at a ﬁrm that does not. We calculate the probabilities using tech-
niques similar to the ball-urn process of Butters (1977), and write them as
λij,w h e r ei is the task/type, and j is the task/type the ﬁrm prefers (the

















































ﬁrms are indiﬀerent and employ mixed strategies.
The proposition follows directly from a comparison of expected payoﬀs
from tasks. The nature of the equilibrium depends on the ratio of the
maximum returns of the ﬁrm from a type h worker versus that of a type l
worker. This ratio of returns is exogenous and depends on the comparison
between output and reservation wages of the types. The returns on the high
skill workers must be suﬃciently larger than the returns on the low skill
worker in order for high skill workers to be preferred. This follows from the
fact that λhh >λ lh, which is intuitive (if ﬁrms prefer high skill workers their
probability of getting hired is larger), making 1−λlh
1−λhh > 1. If, on the other
hand, the returns from low skill workers are actually larger due to their much
lower reservation values, the ﬁrm will prefer the low skill workers (similarly
it is clear that 1−λll
1−λhl < 1). For intermediate values, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent and
mix among the types11.
11While ﬁrms may use diﬀerent mixed strategies, a quick way to observe that all inter-
mediate values of parameters can be achieved is to suppose that all ﬁrms choose the same































Figure 1 displays the equilibria for diﬀerent values of the proportion of







l . We can see that the high skill equilibrium requires a large
proportion of high skill workers present in the market and a high return to
these workers. The low skill equilibrium requires a higher return to low skill
workers, which could mean that high skill workers have similar productivity
to low skill workers in these jobs but a larger reservation wage. If we perform
the comparative static experiment of an increase in the proportion of high
skill workers we ﬁnd that it is possible for a market to switch from low skill
to mixed or from mixed to high skill. So here high skill workers are preferred
when there are more of them around. As we will see later, the equilibrium
strategy: with probability φ they prefer H and with probability (1 − φ) they prefer L.











¯ l can be matched with a φ. Due to the inﬁnite number of mixed strat-
egy equilibria in this region, we restrict comparative static exercises to the regions where
preferences are strict.
10conﬁguration depends on the costs as well. For high costs of entry, the low
skill equilibrium will disappear, as the maximum return on it can’t recover
the costs.
In the wage posting environment in Shimer (1998), high skill workers
are strictly preferred. In the model of Lang, Manove and Dickens (2001),
the market separates completely. How realistic is the notion that ﬁrms may
sometimes prefer lower skilled workers? In our model this preference comes
about explicitly because these ﬁrms believe that the high skilled workers
have many outside options and hence a high reservation wage. Another
motivation can be seen from a recent court case in New London, Connecticut.
A man sued the local police force for not hiring him on the basis that he was
too intelligent (as determined by a standardized test). The deputy police
chief was quoted12 as saying that this man was, “exactly the type of guy
[they] want to screen out...Police work is kind of mundane”. This points
to the fact that high skill workers may actually be relatively unproductive
in low skill jobs. The issues of retention and job satisfaction of prospective
applicants, while not covered explicitly by the model, provide additional
motivation for the results.
The ﬁnal piece of the equilibrium is the zero proﬁt condition for ﬁrms.
The number of ﬁrms M who enter in equilibrium (if task H is preferred) is
determined by equation 2 which we can now rewrite:
(1 − e− 2
M ){βh(1 − λhh)(fh − w
¯
h + d)+( 1− βh)(1 − λlh)(fl − w
¯
l + d)} = d + k
An analogous condition holds if task L is preferred.
All that remains is to verify whether the restriction that wh ≥ wl holds
under the equilibrium we described. Since ﬁrms maximize the payoﬀs from
each task separately, we can’t specify a relationship wh(wl) that assigns a
speciﬁc high and low wage to each ﬁrm, but we should check if the restriction
holds for some conﬁguration of ﬁrms in the equilibrium. A good method for
doing this is checking whether for each wage w, there are more ﬁrms still
oﬀering high skill tasks than there are oﬀering low skill tasks, or, more
concretely, 1−Gh(w) > 1−Gl(w). We do this in the appendix for the both
the high task market and the low task market, and ﬁnd that it holds.
12This story was related in “Help Wanted: The Not-Too-High-Q Standard” (New York
Times, September 19, 1999).
113 Wage Inequality
Each equilibrium deﬁnes expected wages for workers as a function of the
parameters. In this section we seek to identify exactly how an increase in
the proportion of skilled workers may increase the wage gap between the
skilled and unskilled. The wage formation process depends on the matching
frictions, and we will explore how the labor markets therefore diﬀer from
standard supply and demand results.
We can simplify the problem considerably by substituting the wage dis-
tributions into the workers’ expected wage, given in equation 1. This yields
the expression λ2
ijfi +2 λij(1 − λij)w
¯
i, where once again i is the type of
worker and j is the type of worker that is preferred by ﬁrms. This expres-
sion is quite elegant, as it has two clear intuitive interpretations. First, if
we take into account the ‘Diamond paradox’ (if all applicants have only one
successful application, the wage will be the reservation wage of w
¯
i) and the
‘Bertrand result’ (if all applicants have two successful applications, the wage
will be bid up to fi) expected wage can be seen as the probability of two
successful applications multiplied by its payoﬀ (fi) plus the probability of
one successful application times its payoﬀ (w
¯
i). Second, if we think about
Nash Bargaining between a worker and a ﬁrm, the result13 given our setting
would be βfi +( 1− β)w
¯
i,w h e r eβ is the relative bargaining power of the
worker and is between 0 and 1. Here we ﬁnd that the relative bargaining
power arises endogenously from the ability of the worker to compare wages14.
Although the expected wage is quite useful in itself, wage inequality is
concerned with observed wages, that is, measures of wages among employed
people. We can adjust the expected wage to ﬁnd the average wage for a type i
worker by dividing by the probability that the worker ﬁnds employment λ2
ij+















β yields this result.











i since with probability (1 − λij)





We focus the analysis on labor markets that prefer high skilled workers15.
An increase in the proportion of high skill workers µ changes the average
wages of both high skill and low skill workers through the probability of
employment. This change comes through two eﬀects. The direct eﬀect of
an increase in µ is to reduce the probability either type is employed. The
indirect eﬀect comes from the change in the number of ﬁrms M in response
to the change in µ. An increase in M increases the probability that each type
will get a job. The potential opposition of these eﬀects prompts an inspection
into ﬁrms’ entry decisions and hence expected proﬁts. The following lemma
establishes important properties of expected proﬁts:
Lemma 4 Expected proﬁts decrease in the number of ﬁrms M.F o rs o m e
µ∗,e x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts increase with the proportion of high skill workers when
µ<µ ∗, and decrease with the proportion when µ>µ ∗.
The proof involves a large amount of algebra and is therefore not in-
cluded. Both properties are what we would expect intuitively. As the num-
ber of ﬁrms increases, the competition (in the form of getting workers to
accept their positions) among them becomes tougher, lowering proﬁts. An
increase in the proportion of high skill workers has two eﬀects. It increases
the returns to high skill workers since the ﬁrms have more high skill workers
to choose from and each high skill worker has a lower probability of hav-
ing another oﬀer. However, it decreases the returns to low skill workers for
the opposite reason. The eﬀect of an increase in the proportion high skill
workers is strongest when there are not too many of them (i.e. small µ). In
addition, an increase in proﬁts due to more high skilled workers is ampliﬁed
when the return to a high skill worker fh−w
¯
h grows relative to the return
to a low skill worker fl−w
¯
l (µ∗ increases).
Given costly entry into the labor market, a change in the proportion of
high skill workers will aﬀect the number of ﬁrms through the zero proﬁt
condition. This relationship can be found by implicit diﬀerentiation of the












Using the results from Lemma 4, we can sign this expression. For µ<µ ∗,
it is positive, meaning that more high skilled workers encourage ﬁrms to
enter. For µ>µ ∗, it is negative, implying that the returns from entering
are decreasing with the proportion of high skill workers.
15The method of analysis for markets in which ﬁrms prefer low skill workers is similar,
but, unsurprisingly, we do not ﬁnd increasing wage inequality there.
13Wage inequality is expressed as the diﬀerence between skill groups of
observed average wages:











The change in wage inequality with respect to the proportion of high
skilled workers is:



























Here we have made it explicit that the change in wage inequality with
respect to a change in µ is the result of the direct eﬀect (change in the
probability of matching) and the indirect eﬀect (change in the number of
ﬁrms that enter). The following proposition states that only the indirect
eﬀect can cause an increase in wage inequality.
Proposition 5 An increase in the proportion of high skilled workers can
increase wage inequality by attracting the entry of ﬁrms.
The proof is in the appendix, and shows that the direct eﬀect decreases
wage inequality. Consider the following experiment: take one worker who is
of low skill and make that person high skill. All low skill workers who were
previously contending with this worker now face a little tougher competition
from her. All high skill workers, who had no competition from this worker
at all, now have a potential rival. Therefore, by holding the ﬁrm eﬀect
constant, an increase in the proportion of high skilled workers decreases the
probabilities of matching of both types of workers, but aﬀects the high type
more. This then lowers her wage more relative to the low type. This direct
eﬀect is essentially the supply eﬀect from a supply and demand framework.
What remains is to see whether an increase in the proportion of high
skill workers can attract enough ﬁrms to enter to raise their wages. This
is an endogenous demand16 eﬀect, driven solely by the fundamentals of the
problem: relative returns on workers, entry costs, and matching frictions.
In ﬁgure 2, we show that it is possible to have increasing wage inequality
in our setting. Based on simulations, the requirements are high capital
16Indeed, when we consider ﬁrms as the number of positions opened, the interpretation
of the increase as a demand eﬀect is very clear.































costs and positive default penalties (for the simulations we measure them as
percentages of the return on low skill workers fl−w
¯
l). The high capital costs
eliminate the presence of a low skill equilibrium as the maximum returns on
a low skill individual are too low.
The increasing wage inequality takes place in the region of high skill
equilibria where the proportion of high skill individuals is lowest, i.e. is
driven by the increasing proﬁts to ﬁrms of added high skill workers when
there are few around. Wages for high skill workers are increasing strongly in
this region. The wages of low skill workers are increasing by a small amount
in both regions.
Another measure that we are interested is the range of wages, the top
wage minus the bottom wage. This could give some insight into within
group wage inequality. The range for type i in the high skill labor market is
expressed simply as the top wage λihfi +( 1− λ)w
¯





i). Evaluating the change in the ranges for the parameters
above, we ﬁnd that in the region where wage inequality is increasing, the
ranges of wages for high skill workers is increasing sharply and the range
of wages for low skill workers is also increasing but at a smaller rate. Note
that as the bottom wage is ﬁxed, all of the movement comes from the top
wage. There is strong evidence on increasing inequality within groups (for
example, see Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1992)). In the region where wage
inequality is decreasing, the range for high skill workers decreases, but the
range for the low skill workers increases.
3.2 Relationship with the Literature
The issue of which channel increases the demand for skilled labor is quite
important, as it has strong implications for inequality policy. Acemoglu
(1998 and 1999) discusses how the increase in the size of the skilled pop-
ulation encourages skill complementary technological innovation, spurring
demand for high skill workers. In contrast, we oﬀer an explanation for the
rising skill premium solely based on ﬁrm entry. High skill workers therefore
“create” demand for themselves. Had the model included complementarities
with new technologies, the results could be ampliﬁed substantially, making
it important to diﬀerentiate between the two eﬀects.
The search literature splits substantially on how wages are decided upon.
Dynamic search models often assume Nash Bargaining (for example, Ace-
moglu (1999) and Shimer (1998)) while static models usually assume wage
posting (for example, Montgomery (1991) and Shi (2001)). Our work of-
fers a wage posting model that oﬀers a micro-foundation for how bargaining
power is determined. Among wage posting models, the most commonly
used is a directed search model, which describes how workers may direct
one application towards a ﬁrm of their choice having observed the wage
distribution. The directed search approach involves equilibria selection and
mixed strategy equilibria. The closest paper to ours in the directed search
literature is Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2001), which discusses discrimi-
nation. While they are interested in wage diﬀerentials, they do not explore
changes in wage diﬀerentials with the proportion of one type (reasonably so,
given their focus).
164 Conclusion
Data shows that the proportion of the U.S. population with college degrees
has been increasing constantly since the late 1970s17. Supply-demand anal-
ysis, such as that in Katz and Murphy (1992), indicates that the demand for
highly educated workers far outstripped supply since 1980, pushing wages
for these workers constantly upward. The huge demand has been explained
by numerous factors, including technology and international trade. Here we
present an explanation that does not depend on exogenous demand factors
or technological change: increased ﬁrm entry. The increased entry is a re-
sult of increasing returns to matching with high skill workers, a result of
the frictions in the labor market. Further theoretical and empirical work
is needed to isolate the determinants of the wage premium. Separating the
factors leading to the creation of demand for high skill workers would yield
important insight into inequality and policy options.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1




Pr(i others show up)Pr(hired | i show up) (4)
The probability that a type h has a successful application given that
ﬁrms prefer type h (which is labelled λhh) sets the Pr(hired | i show up)







µj(1 − µ)i−j 1
j +1
Using the binomial theorem, this reduces to 1
µ(i+1)(1 − (1 − µ)i+1).W e
plug this into equation 4:















(1 − (1 − µ)i+1)







Since there is a positive mass of workers and ﬁrms, we take the limit as
n and q approach ∞ (noting that the worker application-ﬁrm ratio equals
2
M) and achieve our result.
The proof for the matching probability for a low skill worker when high
skill workers are preferred (λlh) is calculated in a similar way, but the
Pr(hired | is h o wu p )=
(1−µ)i
i+1 . The probabilities for the labor market in
which low skilled workers are preferred can be written directly using these
results.
BM a t c h i n g F i r m s w i t h W a g e s
We are trying to prove that for each wage w, there are more ﬁrms still oﬀering
high skill tasks than there are oﬀering low skill tasks, i.e. 1 − Gh(w) >
1−Gl(w). When the high skill task is preferred, we can rewrite the inequality










fh−w ). Re-arranging yields
( 1−λlh
1−λhh)(λhh














When the low skill task is preferred πl >π h,o r(1−λll +λllGl(w))(fl −
w) > (1 − λhl + λhlGh(w))(fh − w) for any w. Since fh >f l we can then
write 1−λll(1−Gl(w)) > 1−λhl(1−Gh(w)). Using the fact that λll >λ hl
gives us our result that 1 − Gh(w) > 1 − Gl(w).
C Proof of Proposition 5








(2−λlh)2. Since we are in a la-





l) and λhh >λ lh, which together prove that the inequality holds.
The second step is to show 0 > dλlh
dµ ≥ dλhh
dµ . The fact that both ex-
pressions are less than zero is obvious, and is proved in Shapiro (1999). To
18simplify notation, let v = 2
M. We are trying to show d







the denominator is positive, the sign of the expression is equal to the sign
of the numerator. We call the numerator F(u). Then:
F(µ)=( v2µ(1 − µ) − 2)e−vµ +2 ( 1− µ)+2 µe−v
F(µ)=( −2v2(1 + v(1 − 2µ)) + v2(v2µ(1 − µ) − 2))e−vµ
Evaluating at the endpoints, F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 0. Since v (0,1] and
µ [0,1], F(µ) < 0, which then means that F(µ) is concave and greater
than or equal to zero for all µ. Using this fact, all F(µ) must be less than
or equal to F(1). Evaluating, F(1) = 0, which proves the proposition.
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